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ABSTRACT 
The emergence of strategic foresight from scenarios has constantly puzzled theorists. Whilst 
practitioners and scholars of scenario planning contend that scenarios generate strategic 
foresight by both stretching a manager’s mental model by exposing them to a wide range of 
equally plausible futures, and triggering and accelerating processes of organisational learning, 
the true nature of this link between strategic foresight and organizational learning remains 
vague and undertheorized. Our paper tackles this puzzle by explicitly focussing on how 
strategic foresight emerges from the organizational learning process that unfolds during 
scenario planning. We undertook a 24-month long longitudinal study capturing both ‘actions’ 
and ‘reflections’ of a leading Scotch whisky manufacturer during their scenario planning 
exercises. Surprisingly, and perhaps counterintuitively, our findings unearth the role of 
‘unlearning’ rather than ‘learning’ as a key mechanism that leads to the emergence of 
strategic foresight within the scenario planning process. Further reflection on the ‘unlearning 
process’ reveals that unlearning involves a ‘letting go’ or relaxing of deeply held assumptions 
and this in turn inadvertently leads to strategic foresight. Overall, by developing and 
introducing ‘unlearning’ as a key mechanism for the generation of strategic foresight, our 
paper aims to improve the effectiveness of scenario planning interventions as practiced. 
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Strategic foresight is deemed to play a crucial role in determining how organizations 
successfully compete, evolve, and survive in dynamic and disruptive environments (Tapinos 
& Pyper, 2018; Ramirez & Selsky, 2016; Sarpong & Maclean, 2016; Rhisiart, et al., 2015; 
Peter & Jarratt, 2015; Coates, et al., 2010). Scenarios have a long history and well established 
reputation in helping organizations generate strategic foresight (Spaniol & Rowland, 2018; 
Derbyshire & Wright, 2017; Wright, et al., 2015; Ramirez, et al., 2011; Varum & Melo, 
2010; Cairns, et al., 2004; van der Heijden, et al., 2002; Duncan & Wack, 1993; Wack, 
1985a; 1985b). Scholars contend that scenarios generate strategic foresight by offering 
“analysis, communication, education of the organization and stakeholders in both possibilities 
and ways of thinking” (Ringland, 2010, p. 1495) about the future.  
Foresight from scenarios, as prior research suggests, results from the stretching of a 
management team’s mental models (Cornelius, et al., 2005; Cairns, et al., 2004; Grant, 2003; 
Schoemaker, 1995), opening up of management thinking by developing a number of equally 
plausible futures (van der Heijden, et al., 2002) that help overcome managerial blind-spots 
(Day & Schoemaker, 2004) and by triggering and accelerating the processes of organizational 
learning (Chermack & van der Merwe, 2003; Bootz, 2010). Implicit in these theoretical 
conjectures are the strong ties linking strategic foresight and learning processes (Bootz, et al., 
2019; Haeffner, et al., 2012; Bootz, 2010; Bood & Postma, 1997). However, despite these 
conjectures, “the true nature of this link remains vague” (Bootz, 2010, p. 1588) and a 
compelling explanation for how scenarios actually lead to strategic foresight is still missing 
in the scenario literature (Bootz, et al., 2019; Tapinos & Pyper, 2018; Rhisiart, et al., 2015; 
Haeffner, et al., 2012). So how does organizational learning emanating from scenarios 
generate strategic foresight? 
There are three main reasons why this theoretical lacuna persists. First, despite claims 
that scenarios offer support to strategic decision makers (Rohrbeck, 2012; Postma & Liebl, 
2005), much of the scholarship on scenarios has been plagued by both a “dismal” state of 
theory and “methodological chaos” (Spaniol & Rowland, 2018, p. 33). “Scenarios”, as 
Wilkinson, Kupers and Mangalagiu (2013) aptly put it, “are best described as a highly 
innovative, pragmatic field of practice grappling with theoretical grounding” (p. 699). 
Progress, would therefore depend on developing a coherent theoretical framework that 
resonates with how scenarios and their corresponding impact unfold in practice.  
Second, much of the scenarios research has been influenced by three dominant 
traditions, namely, intuitive-logic models, la prospective models and the probabilistic 
modified trend models (Varum & Melo, 2010; Bradfield, et al., 2005). Important distinctions 
between these traditions notwithstanding, much of the theoretical conjectures about foresight 
from such research rely on different understandings of process. Process, according to Van de 
Ven (1992, p. 169),  is often used in three ways in the literature: (1) a  logic used to explain a 
causal relationship in a variance theory, (2) a  category of concepts that refer to actions of 
individuals or organizations, and (3) a sequence of events that describe how things change 
over  time. While the first two understandings of process are widespread within the intuitive-
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logic, la prospective and the probabilistic modified trend traditions of scenario planning, 
there is a paucity of research that explores scenarios from the third perspective.  As Van de 
Ven (1992) astutely observes, in the first two instances, theorising depends on a story or logic 
that “is used to explain why an independent (input) variable exerts a causal influence on a 
dependent (outcome) variable” (p. 170) without the theorists actually observing the process. 
Theoretical advancement would thus depend on embracing a ‘process’ approach (Langley, et 
al., 2013; Langley, 1999) where cross-sectional observations or retrospective case histories 
are replaced by studying the actual “sequence of events” (Poole, et al., 2000) that describe 
how and why scenarios generate strategic foresight.  
Third, even though several key scholars have suggested that learning is a key 
component of scenario planning (van der Heijden, 2005; de Geus, 1998; Schwartz, 1991) and 
plays a critical role in the generation of strategic foresight (Bootz, et al., 2019; Bootz, 2010; 
Chermack & van der Merwe, 2003; Bood & Postma, 1997), it is surprising that little attempt 
has been made to integrate the extensive literature on organizational learning with the theory 
on scenario planning. As Chermack (2005) correctly observes “while the conceptual case 
linking learning and scenario planning has been made, there are no empirical studies that 
support or refute this relationship” (p. 62). Thus, understanding the mechanisms through 
which the learning processes that unfold during scenario planning generate strategic foresight 
would not only require a deeper theoretical integration of the literatures on organisational 
learning and scenario planning but would also warrant an empirical exploration into how 
strategic foresight emerges from the organisational learning process. 
To summarise, the theoretical fragmentation within the scenarios literature, the 
underdeveloped status of longitudinal ‘process’ research within scenarios scholarship and the 
relatively little attention devoted to integrating the literatures on strategic foresight and 
organizational learning have all ensured that the complex processes that link organizational 
learning to strategic foresight remain undertheorized and underexplored. Consequently, on 
one hand prior research has established the contribution of scenario planning to a culture of 
learning in organizations (Bootz, et al., 2019; Haeffner, et al., 2012; Chermack, et al., 2005; 
de Geus, 1998) while on the other hand, prior research has also highlighted the contradictions 
of such claims by demonstrating how scenario planning can actually narrow mental models 
and make organizations even more prone to ‘blindsiding’ than they would be without it 
(Chermack, et al., 2015; Derbyshire & Wright, 2014; Wright, et al., 2013; Wright & 
Goodwin, 2009). Therefore, we still know very little about the links between organisational 
learning and strategic foresight.  
So how does strategic foresight emerge from scenario planning? Our paper aims to 
answer this question, both, theoretically and empirically by unpacking the ‘black box’ that 
links organizational learning, strategic foresight and the scenario planning process. To do 
this, we first undertook a three-part literature review. In part one we analysed the literature 
that links strategic foresight to the scenario planning process. In part two, we consult the 
literature on organizational learning and review the findings from the learning literature in 
tandem with the theories linking learning with strategic foresight. In part three, we explore 
the role of learning and ‘unlearning’ in generating strategic foresight. A synthesis of our 
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review reveals that scenario theorists have unproblematically imported assumptions of 
organizational learning into the scenarios literature. Since organizational learning is 
susceptible to ‘learning traps’ (Levitt & March, 1988), this could lead to strategic oversight 
rather than foresight (March, 2008). The organizational learning literature review also 
highlights the crucial yet underemphasized role played by ‘unlearning’: a promising concept 
for overcoming these limitations.  
To reinforce these emergent theoretical insights, we undertook a 24-month long 
longitudinal study capturing both ‘actions’ and ‘reflections’ (Bootz, et al., 2019; Bootz, 2010) 
of a leading Scotch whisky manufacturer during their scenario planning exercises. 
Surprisingly, and perhaps counterintuitively, our findings unearth the role of ‘unlearning’ 
rather than ‘learning’ as a key mechanism that leads to the emergence of strategic foresight 
within the scenario planning process. Drawing on empirical evidence from scenario planning 
workshops, we outline the stages of the unlearning process and argue that strategic foresight 
from scenarios stems from ‘unlearning’. By exploring the etymological German roots of the 
word ‘learn’ which originally meant ‘to furrow’, unlearning, we argue, implies eradicating 
furrows and returning to the unfurrowed flux of organisational experience from which new 
possibilities are ‘relevated’ (Paton, et al., 2014). Unlearning requires letting go or relaxing 
the rigidities of previously held assumptions and beliefs, rather than forgetting them, as part 
of the general approach to creating strategic foresight.  
Overall, our paper makes three significant contributions. First, we offer a theoretical 
analysis of the links between organizational learning, strategic foresight and the scenario 
planning process. This exercise not only clarifies the conceptual links between these 
previously unintegrated concepts but also allows us to unpack the complexities associated 
with learning and foresight. Second, our process methodology, offers yet another arrow into 
the methodological quiver of scenario scholars. By empirically tracing the emergence of 
strategic foresight from scenario planning, our process approach offers a more robust means 
to fortify foresight theory. Finally, by developing and introducing ‘unlearning’ as a key 
dynamic within the scenario planning process, our paper aims to improve the effectiveness of 
scenario planning interventions as practiced. 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. First, we undertake a three-part 
literature review that analyses the conceptual links between strategic foresight, scenarios and 
organizational learning. Next, we present the methodology used for investigating the research 
question. The following two sections present the findings and analysis from our longitudinal 
field research. In the penultimate section, we discuss the implications of our findings and 
analysis for the theory and practice of strategic foresight. Finally, we conclude by 
summarising our contributions and suggesting avenues for future research.   
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Strategic Foresight and the Scenarios Planning Process 
The scenario planning approach has been widely deployed and successfully used to 
boost strategic foresight within in a wide range of organisations including Shell (Cornelius, et 
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al., 2005; de Geus, 1998), British Airways (Moyer, 1996), ICL (Ringland, 1998) and Nokia 
(Siilasmaa, 2019). Organizations use scenarios to “create and maintain a high-quality, 
coherent and functional forward view, and to use the insights arising in useful organizational 
ways" (Slaughter, 1995; Ringland, 2010, p. 1494). Yet, despite the enthusiastic embrace of 
scenarios by strategy practitioners, the scholarship on scenarios reveals a “paucity of theory” 
(Bradfield, et al., 2016, p. 60) and “methodological chaos” (Martelli, 2001). The persistence 
of these theoretical gaps have prevented scholars from developing a comprehensive 
understanding of the links between strategic foresight and scenario planning (Spaniol & 
Rowland, 2018; Wright, et al., 2015; Coates, et al., 2010).  
The primary source of this methodological chaos has been the imprecise use of the 
term ‘foresight’. Within the scenarios literature, ‘foresight’ has been “used to designate the 
process as well as those tools used in creating the image” (Coates, et al., 2010, p. 1423) of the 
future. This failure to distinguish between three very distinct aspects of ‘foresight’ studies, 
namely, the scenario planning process, the resulting scenarios and the strategic ‘foresight’ 
derived from these scenarios, has led to a proliferation of foresight research where theorists 
speak simultaneously of the appearance of new “mental models” (Ringland, 2010, p. 1498) as 
scenarios and of scenarios as the process that creates or brings strategic foresight into being. 
Scenarios are, in other words, simultaneously reduced to both, a mechanism and an output. 
The result has been an assembly of empirical generalizations which neither resonate with the 
scenario planner’s ongoing challenges nor are general enough for practitioners to adopt. 
Theory advancement, therefore demands precise conceptualization that captures the nuances 
of the phenomena under investigation by clearly distinguishing between the scenario 
planning process, the resulting scenarios and the emergent foresight. 
In order to make this distinction, we define the scenario planning process as the 
means of “creating stories of equally plausible futures and planning as though any one could 
move forward” (Tucker, 1999, p. 70). Scenarios are then defined as a “hypothetical sequence 
of events leading to a possible future” (Kahn & Wiener, 1967, p. 6). Scenarios, therefore 
emerge from the scenario planning process. Strategic foresight refers to “the ability to see 
through the apparent confusion, to spot developments before they become trends, to see 
patterns before they emerge, and to grasp the relevant features of social currents that are 
likely to shape the direction of future events” (Whitehead, 1967, p. 89). This definition 
accommodates two contrasting understandings of 'foresight'. In the first, foresight refers to 
insights gained from anticipations of the future (Tapinos & Pyper, 2018; Ringland, 2010; 
1998) whereas in the second, foresight is attained through a better understanding of the 
'present' in the here and now. We are thus able to account for two distinct yet complementary 
understanding of ‘foresight’ which is not readily evident within the mainstream scenarios 
literature. In other words, foresight is derived from scenarios. Figure 1 below summarises the 
distinction between the scenario planning process, resulting scenarios and strategic foresight. 
<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
Reconceptualising scenario planning as a process and scenarios and strategic foresight 
as outcomes of that process has an added advantage of avoiding the “episodic, linear nature” 
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of scenarios that “makes them appear ‘cognitivist’ and ultra-rational in form” (Sarpong & 
Maclean, 2016, p. 2813). Put differently, the clear distinction between the scenario planning 
process, scenarios and strategic foresight allows theorists to pry open the scenario planning 
process and explore the temporal sequence of activities that lead to scenarios and to the 
subsequent strategic foresight that these scenarios yield. Conceptual clarity on the links 
between scenarios and strategic foresight thus makes it possible to ask: How do scenarios 
generate strategic foresight? 
2.2 Organizational Learning, Learning Traps and Strategic Foresight 
Several scenario scholars have acknowledged the crucial role played by 
organizational learning in the generation of strategic foresight (Bootz, et al., 2019; Bootz, 
2010; Chermack, 2005; van der Heijden, 2004; Chermack & van der Merwe, 2003; Bood & 
Postma, 1997). Prior research has defined organizational learning as “the process of 
improving actions through better knowledge and understanding” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p. 803). 
Scenario planning scholars contend that learning allows the organization to re-perceive its 
environment (Wack, 1985a; 1985b) and this re-perception leads to strategic foresight 
(Chermack, 2005). Yet, several scholars have disputed this logic. They argue that scenario 
planning can also inhibit learning by distorting perceptions of environmental uncertainty by 
using simplistic assumptions that narrow mental models and limit the range of possible 
outcomes (Derbyshire & Wright, 2014; Wright, et al., 2013; Wright & Goodwin, 2009). In 
other words, organizational learning from scenarios can lead to either strategic foresight or 
oversight (Chermack, et al., 2015). Since little effort has been devoted to assessing the 
cognitive and evaluative limitations on organizational learning, assessing this claim requires 
us to re-examine the relationship between scenarios and the organisational learning process.  
In scrutinizing the scenarios literature to delineate the relationship between scenarios, 
organizational learning and strategic foresight, we find mostly conjunctures and limited 
empirical research (Bootz, et al., 2019; Chermack, et al., 2015; Haeffner, et al., 2012). The 
prevailing widespread assumption within the scenarios literature is that by “building a set of 
internally consistent and imagined futures in which decisions about the future can be played 
out” (Chermack, 2011, p. 16), scenarios can foster organization learning that lead to strategic 
foresight. Put differently, scenarios generate strategic foresight through organizational 
learning where learning is defined as “the detection and correction of errors” and errors are 
defined as “any feature of knowledge or of knowing that makes action ineffective” (Argyris, 
1976, p. 365). Thus for organizational learning to yield strategic foresight, we must show how 
scenarios led to the detection and correction of errors. Without this, it is incorrect to assume 
that organizational learning leads to strategic foresight. 
Debates over whether organizational learning should be understood as a change in 
cognition or behaviour are a recurring theme within the learning literature (Argote & Miron-
Spektor, 2011; Fiol & Lyles, 1985). The implications of this distinction between cognition 
and behaviour find expression within the scenarios literature when scholars make a 
distinction between “foresight attitude” and “foresight activity” (Bootz, 2010, p. 1588). The 
former refers to the “cognitive dimensions of anticipation and to individual learning” and the 
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latter refers to the behaviour of a “groups of individuals participating in more interactive 
learning within organizations” (Rhisiart, et al., 2015, p. 126). Due to these distinctions, 
definitions of organizational learning assume a change in the organization’s knowledge that 
occurs as a function of experiences (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Easterby-Smith, et al., 
2000). In other words, experience plays a key role in linking the organizational learning 
process that unfolds during scenario planning with strategic foresight.  
Therefore when scenario theorists like Bood and Postma (1997) incorporate Kolb’s 
(1984) learning theory and Piaget’s (1977; 1937; 1936) learning theory, or when Chermack 
and van der Merwe (2003) incorporate Senge’s (1999) three stage organizational learning 
process, or when van der Heijden (2004) invokes a constructivist organizational learning 
process, or when Bootz, et al (2019) draw on Argyris and Schön’s (1978) theory of single and 
double loop learning, they are all implicitly emphasizing the crucial role of concrete 
experiences that groups of individuals participating in the scenario planning process draw on 
while building a set of internally consistent and imagined futures. Since building plausible 
scenarios requires drawing on experiences from the past to imagine a hypothetical future, 
experience plays a key role in linking scenarios and organizational learning. Yet, learning 
from experience is fraught with difficulties and plagued by three significant learning traps, 
namely, the competency trap, superstitious learning trap and the myopia trap (Levitt & 
March, 1988; Levinthal & March, 1993). 
The competency trap arises when learning from experience encourages organizations 
to stick to and refine the skills that they have already honed to a finer degree rather than 
spend time developing new skills (March & Coutu, 2006). Organizations learn from 
experience what strategies to use, thereby gaining competence in the strategies they use. If 
the organization uses a strategy and experiences favourable outcomes, they will repeat the 
strategy. The more a particular strategy is used, the more competent the organization using it 
becomes. Competency increases the likelihood of a favourable outcome which in turn 
reinforces the use of the strategy. Thus, the organization could quickly become firmly 
committed to a particular strategy, given their competence at it. However, they are likely to 
be trapped with an inferior strategy by the positive feedback loop of their own competency 
(March, 2008, p. 88). The competency trap can therefore lead to strategic oversight. 
“Superstitious learning” trap, as Levitt and March (1988) describe, “occurs when the 
subjective experience of learning is compelling, but the connections between actions and 
outcomes are misspecified” (p. 325). Situations where the subjective evaluation of success or 
failure is insensitive to actions that the firm takes can trigger superstitious learning within an 
organisation. For example, executives from an oil pump manufacturer might believe that 
higher profits in years where the global oil prices are high are a result of their superior 
management practices. However, when global oil prices are low, the same executives are 
likely to blame the business environment rather than their management practices for the drop 
in profits. The superstitious learning trap can thus cause strategic oversight. 
Finally, the myopia trap refers to the tendency within experience based learning to 
overlook distant times, distant places, and failures (Levinthal & March, 1993). As Levinthal 
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and March (1993) explain: “The first form of myopia is the tendency to ignore the long run. 
The short run is privileged by organizational learning. As a result, long run survival is 
sometimes endangered.  The second form of myopia is the tendency to ignore the larger 
picture. The near neighbourhood is privileged by organizational learning. As a result, survival 
of more encompassing systems is sometimes endangered. The third form of myopia is the 
tendency to overlook failures. The lessons gained from success are privileged by 
organizational learning” (p. 101). Consequently, myopia leads firms to underestimate the 
risks of failure. The myopia trap is thus yet another source of organizational oversight.  
In light of these learning traps, some organizational learning scholars have proposed 
‘unlearning’ as the means for overcoming the challenges of learning from experience (Tsang, 
2017a; 2017b; Starbuck, 2017; Howells & Scholderer, 2016; Becker, 2010; Becker, 2008; 
Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984; Hedberg, 1981).  
2.3 Learning, Unlearning and Strategic Foresight 
To recap our earlier argument, to assert that organizational learning generates 
strategic foresight requires theorists to demonstrate how learning from scenarios lead to the 
detection and correction of errors where errors refer to knowledge-in-use that makes action 
ineffective. Therefore, detection of errors can become both a condition of organizational 
learning and a consequence of it. Scholars of organizational learning have acknowledged this 
argument by distinguishing between ‘single loop’ and ‘double loop’ learning (Argyris & 
Schön, 1978; Bootz, et al., 2019).  
Single loop learning occurs when errors are corrected without altering “the 
fundamental design, goals and activities” (Argyris, 1976, p. 367) of the organization. Single 
loop learning thus involves learning from experience. However, learning from experience, as 
we have already seen, is fraught with learning traps. Learning traps ensure that errors are no 
longer detected, corrected or both. Learning traps thus inhibit organizational learning which 
in turn supresses the generation of strategic foresight. Therefore, overcoming these ‘learning 
traps’ to create strategic foresight requires double loop learning. 
Double loop learning occurs when the fundamental design, goals and activities of the 
organization are confronted, challenged, questioned (Bootz, et al., 2019; Argyris & Schön, 
1978) and are then recognized as the cause of ineffective action (Argyris & Schön, 1978). 
This triggers a re-imagination of an organization’s “system of norms, beliefs and 
organizational rules” (Bootz, et al., 2019, p. 93). The relationship between ‘single’ and 
double loop learning is summarised in Figure 2. 
<INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
For example, when photography companies like Fujifilm and Kodak, develop and 
improve on their technical expertise in silver-based photosensitive film making materials, the 
resulting developments and improvements are a result of single loop learning. However, if 
these firms switch to develop and improve on the key technologies of the digital era, such as 
imaging software and digitalization of printing plates as the basis for photography, then these 
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are considered to be outcomes of ‘double loop’ learning. This is because, without double loop 
learning, the ‘learning traps’ would ensure that Fujifilm and Kodak continue to build on their 
proprietary technical expertise – the photography technology built up over the years, 
including high precision coating of chemicals on film – which would no longer be relevant in 
the digital era. Put differently, within these firms, strategic foresight would require not only 
‘learning’ the limits of chemical photography technology (i.e. single loop learning) but also 
replacing the chemical photography technology paradigm with the digital photography 
technologies paradigm (i.e. double loop learning).  
In other words, single loop learning can detect errors (ineffectiveness of chemical 
photography technology in a digital era) but because of ‘learning traps’ cannot correct them 
thereby causing these errors to persist. Overcoming these errors requires overcoming the 
‘learning traps’ which in turn requires double loop learning. Given the crucial role of double 
loop learning for strategic foresight, we must now ask: How can scenarios generate strategic 
foresight by effecting a switch from single to double loop learning?  
Prior research has speculated on the crucial role played by ‘unlearning’ in facilitating 
this switch (Starbuck, 2017; Tsang, 2017a; 2017b). While the literature offers several 
definitions for ‘unlearning’, it broadly refers to “the process by which individuals and 
organizations acknowledge and release prior learning (including assumptions and mental 
frameworks) in order to accommodate new information and behaviours” (Becker, 2010, p. 
252). Unlearning can thus facilitate new knowledge creation by enabling firms to discover the 
limits of their current beliefs and methods (Starbuck, 1996). However, recent research by 
Howells and Scholderer (2016) has called into question some of the assumptions 
underpinning ‘unlearning’.  
According to Howells and Scholderer (2016), unlearning is an ‘empirically 
unwarranted’ concept for two reasons. First, they claim that ‘unlearning’ lacks a firm root 
within the psychology literature from which it claims to originate (Hedberg, 1981; Nystrom 
& Starbuck, 1984) and so question the relevance of ‘unlearning’ research for management 
practice. Yet, proponents for ‘unlearning’ counter this first claim by arguing that "whether 
and how far the concept of organizational unlearning has a firm root in the psychology 
literature should not significantly affect its usefulness in advancing organizational research" 
because as "a metaphor, organizational unlearning helps researchers describe certain 
phenomena" (Tsang, 2017a, p. 40) that has a significant bearing on management practice. 
They claim that ‘unlearning’ helps to “label phenomena that cannot be comfortably fit in the 
domain of organizational learning” and argue that ‘unlearning’ aids theory development by 
offering “precision in conceptualization so that nuances of different phenomena can be 
captured” (Tsang, 2017a, p. 42) by researchers. 
Second, central to Howells and Scholderer’s (2016) critique of ‘unlearning’ is their 
proposal to replace ‘unlearning’ with ‘theory-change’. They claim that such a substitution can 
be made without “loss of intellectual value” (p. 459).  According to them, ‘theory’ and 
‘theory-change” are defined as: 
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“Theory is a “system of ideas held as explanation of a group of facts or phenomena” 
(Oxford English Dictionary 2nd edn.1989) and our understanding of the process of theory-change 
is that the acquisition of new facts or phenomena may challenge established theory so that the 
theory may eventually be set aside in favour of an alternative with perceived superior explanatory 
power” (Howells & Scholderer, 2016, p. 445). 
However, theorists sympathetic to ‘unlearning’ have questioned Howells and 
Scholderer’s (2016) notion of ‘theory change’ by arguing that it’s “sloppy wording is not 
conducive to formulating rigorous arguments” (Tsang, 2017a, p. 45). As Tsang (2017a) 
astutely observes: 
“Unlike theories, practices are created for the purpose of achieving certain objectives, 
rather than explaining “a group of facts or phenomena”. By the same token, one practice is 
replaced by another, not because the latter is perceived to have “superior explanatory power”. Last 
but not the least, it makes no sense to talk about the acquisition of new phenomena, because 
phenomena can be observed but not acquired” (pp. 44-45). 
This ensuing debate between the opponents and proponents of ‘unlearning’ has led to 
calls for a more precise conceptualization and greater clarity on the role of ‘unlearning’ 
within organizational learning (Tsang, 2017b; Starbuck, 2017). However, unlearning remains 
a relatively underdeveloped concept within both organizational learning and strategic 
foresight research. Therefore, further research is required to better understand the links 
between organizational learning, unlearning and their role in generating strategic foresight 
from scenarios. 
2.4 Summary 
In this three-part literature review, we have analysed and evaluated research that 
theorizes the links between scenarios, strategic foresight and organizational learning. Our 
review has identified imprecise conceptualization where scenarios are simultaneously 
considered as both, a mechanism and an output, as the primary reason for the field’s 
methodological chaos. The review also establishes the need for more process research 
(Langley, 1999; Van de Ven, 1992; Van de Ven & Huber, 1990) within scenarios and 
foresight studies. Exploring the theoretical links between strategic foresight and 
organizational learning allowed us to show how much of the scenario literature assume that 
organizational learning straightforwardly leads to strategic foresight. These assumptions are 
based on learning from organizational experience (Bootz, et al., 2019; Rhisiart, et al., 2015; 
van der Heijden, 2004; Chermack & van der Merwe, 2003; Bood & Postma, 1997).  
However, reviewing the challenges of learning from organizational experience 
revealed three valuable insights. First, it highlighted the possibilities of ‘learning traps’, 
namely the competency, superstitious learning and the myopia trap which could lead to 
oversight rather than foresight. Second, it suggests the presence of two very different kinds of 
learning, namely single and double loop learning. Third, it showed how ‘learning traps’ can 
confine organizations to single loop learning that inhibits strategic foresight. Overcoming 
these challenges requires organizations to switch from single loop to double loop learning. 
Our analysis also speculates on the role of unlearning as a mechanism to facilitate this switch. 
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These insights suggest that to “grasp the true nature of the link between foresight and 
organizational learning” (Bootz, 2010, p. 1592), we must empirically pry open the ‘black 
box’ that links scenarios, strategic foresight and organizational learning. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Context and company background 
In order to empirically explore the links between organisational learning and strategic 
foresight, we undertook a 24 month long longitudinal field study with a leading Scotch 
whisky producer (Langley, et al., 2013; Langley, 1999; Van de Ven & Huber, 1990). Having 
been founded in the 19th century, the company has a full-range of distilling, blending, bottling 
and brand management capabilities. Its portfolio includes both iconic single malt Scotch 
whisky brands as well as UK’s leading blended whisky. 
At the time of research, the firm’s business context was characterised by flat demand 
for spirits and whisky, creating a highly competitive price sensitive market. Concerns were 
also evident about the level of tax and duties levied by the UK Government on Scotch whisky 
and spirits. Together, the price sensitivity and taxes were putting pressure on margins 
(Company Annual Reports). With flat demand a number of distilleries were either closed or 
‘moth-balled’ as historical levels of Scotch whisky production had created a ‘whisky loch’ 
(Buxton & Hughes, 2012, p. 261). As a consequence, some distillers had resorted to selling 
whisky in bulk at discounted prices. Year-on-year production levels resulted in Scotch 
whisky stocks rising in the company’s balance sheets (Company Annual Reports). The 
following participants from the whisky producer took part in the scenario workshops:  
• Managing Director 
• Operations Director 
• Operations Manager  
• Quality Manager 
• Human Resource Director 
• Marketing Director  
• Financial Director  
• Group Business Development Manager  
These participants (henceforth referred to as the management team) remained in place 
throughout the 4 workshops and 16 one on one meetings that were undertaken as part of this 
research. They were all engaged in the activities described in this paper. Thus our unit of 
analysis for this study was ‘team-level’ learning which triggered changes to the collective 
cognition of the management team. 
3.2 Scenario planning activities and workshops 
In light of the challenges described above, the management team were interested in 
using the scenario approach to help them understand the future of the global market for 
Scotch whisky and spirits in order to support their business planning activities. At the time 
exports were predominately to USA, France and Japan. Other markets were not as developed 
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in comparison with today’s industry. There were several third-party supply chains, with 
limited in-house supply chain capability. In the UK, whisky and spirits were predominately 
sold off-trade though supermarkets, with the remainder of sales through on-trade public 
houses and restaurants. 
The scenario project was designed around a number of key activities and 4 workshops 
(van der Heijden, et al., 2002). First, the scenario facilitator conducted one-to-one interviews 
(which the researcher attended) with all members of the management team to explore and 
learn about their individual views and concerns regarding the opportunities and challenges 
facing their firm (and the industry) (Alvesson, 2003). [The researcher also conducted 
informal meetings with all members of the management team.] Second, after (anonymising 
and) analysing the interviews, the emergent themes from the interviews (and supporting 
comments) were shared with the management team in Workshop 1 (Langley, 1999). The 
feedback had a three-fold purpose. First, to validate and ensure accuracy of the interview 
data. Second, to highlight to the management team a spectrum of views held by them. Third, 
to jointly agree the focus of the scenario development workshop (Workshop 2) this followed 
a few weeks later. The focal issues agreed by the management team during workshop 1 were: 
• Technological developments, including the process of accelerating the whisky aging 
process, advances in bottling technology, and environmental developments in 
bottling/packaging/production 
• Lifestyle effects, including health implications for whisky, consumer attitudes to 
alcohol, and development of attitudes to recreational drugs 
• Demand and demand drivers, including other spirits pricing, attitudes to duty on 
alcohol, growth areas in world spirits market, changes in seasonality, whisky as a 
percentage of spirits, life cycle of whisky, relative position of Japanese whisky, 
average age of whisky drinker 
• Trends in presentation, including packaging, product differentiation, and promotion 
• Distribution structure, including ownership of distribution channels, changes in 
methods of distribution     
• Consumer attitudes, including consumer preferences for price / quality, percentage of 
buyers-own-brand whisky, whisky as a gift item, consumer preferences for whisky in 
the future 
• Industry structure, including opportunities for joint ventures, competition, trends in 
vertical integration/disintegration, consolidation within the big six, bottling costs in 
other countries, industry attitudes to bottling 
Source: internal company document 
3.3 Data Sources and Data Analysis 
Face-to-face meetings (Alvesson, 2003) and participant observation (Ingold, 2011) 
were the primary means of gathering data. However, as Ingold (2011) reminds us, participant 
observation refers not to “see what is ‘out there’” but rather to “watch what is going on” (p. 
223 our emphasis). Detailed verbatim notes and observations were recorded, capturing 
speaker, setting, time and responses during the 4 scenario project workshops. Key in situ 
moments were noted and discussed at the participant’s earliest possible convenience in order 
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to develop a deeper understanding of their comment(s) (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Critical 
incidents were also noted as they occurred (Flanaghan, 1954; Chell, 1998; Butterfield, et al., 
2005). All critical incidents, with supporting explanations were recorded in a database for 
further analysis.  In total, there were 213 critical incidents. All empirical data was then coded 
for further analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). We followed "an 
approach that captures concepts relevant to the human organizational experience in terms that 
are adequate at the level of meaning of the people living that experience and adequate at the 
level of scientific theorizing about that experience" (Gioia, et al., 2012, p. 16). During the 
data analysis, we first moved from the raw empirical data to first order themes (Van Maanen, 
1979; Gioia, et al., 2012). Our inductive and iterative data coding and data analysis process is 
summarised in Figure 3. 
<INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
Themes were identified, coded and iteratively analysed to identify the following first 
order themes: 
• Challenge to investment, operational and strategic priorities 
• Precious Scotch / Whisky is King, Branding and Operational Efficiency key to 
success 
• Information is king, Information technology and management key to success and 
Customer centric reorganization required 
• Need to restore external and internal fit, need for strategic realignment 
Next, we explored the temporal complexity inherent within these first order themes by 
undertaking a longitudinal analysis of the critical incidents and empirical notes. The process 
allowed us to jointly explore both the actions and reflections attributed to organisational 
learning. This resulted in further refinement of the initially observed themes from which we 
unearthed four second order themes (refer Figure 3) listed below:   
• Challenge to managerial assumptions 
• Rigidities of imagination  
• Unlearning 
• Inquiry and (Re)learning 
The key advantage of adopting a longitudinal process research methodology 
(Langley, et al., 2013; Langley, 1999; Van de Ven & Huber, 1990), such as the one followed 
here, is that it allows scholars to capture both ‘reflections’ of participants in the scenario 
planning workshops as well as track their subsequent organizational ‘actions’. Capturing both 
reflections and actions allows us to theorize the links between organizational learning and 
strategic foresight. Since actions are observed rather than assumed, we can evaluate if the 
reflections from scenarios produce strategic foresight. Therefore, even though we focussed on 
capturing collective cognition and ‘team-level’ learning at the workshops, our longitudinal 
research design allowed us to track and validate how this team-level learning got translated 
into subsequent organizational actions. Capturing both organizational actions and 
management team reflections thereby allowed us to empirically establish the relationship 
14 
 
between learning and foresight. In the next section, we present conversational excerpts from 
our face-to-face meetings and scenario planning workshops to substantiate the above listed 
themes.  
4. FINDINGS 
In this section, we discuss and explore the findings, including first order concepts and 
second order themes in more detail. The discussion follows the scenario planning workshop 
sequence. A key insight from the data analysis is the nature and extent of the challenge to the 
management team’s assumptions. The findings highlight that the scenario planning process 
created the time and space for the management team to understand the limitations of their 
ideas and experiences to open up new possibilities. 
Categorization of the initial remarks gathered from the interviews revealed that 47.5% 
of the comments made pertained to internal issues, yet another 47.5% of the remarks were 
about potential opportunities, and the remaining 5% of comments were about possible threats 
to the business. When the management team were presented with these findings, the 
following conversation ensued: 
HR Director: “The weight of the data in the interviews feedback is interesting, vulnerabilities are 
less than expected.” 
Operations Director: “Does that tell you anything?” 
Managing Director: “Healthy?” 
Operations Director: “Or complacency?” 
Excerpt 1 
This conversation highlights the rosy, optimistic view that the management team had 
about their future. This view was also supported by the firm’s profitability and steady 
performance recorded in the Company Annual Reports. However, as the scenario planning 
process unfolded, it forced the management team to make explicit some of their deeply held 
assumptions about the ‘state of the business’. This in turn led them to connect previously 
unconnected events and experiences:  
Marketing Director: “With static demand the distributor is all powerful. The whisky industry 
accelerated this situation by selling surplus whisky. The distributor is the brand; they own the 
consumer. We do not fit into this.” 
Operations Director: “We might only have one final EU distributor. We can see a trend with 
Intermarche.” 
Marketing Director: “The distributor is driven by margin!” 
Group Business Development Manager: “This is a daunting picture!” 
Excerpt 2 
As the comments suggest, the management team began to realise that power in the 
supply chain and wider industry context has moved to the distributor. Previously the 
management team had noted (on many occasions) that Scotch whisky was the scarce resource 
and believed that power lay with the producers. They were beginning to see for the first time 
a new basis of organising in the wider industry. Investment in information technology, 
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logistics and supply chain management by distributors was emerging as the basis of a shift in 
power. 
This realisation challenged the management team’s understanding of their business 
and their current context. As a consequence of the challenge and new interpretation of the 
wider processes in play in the industry, further reflection on and discussion of their situation 
was captured during a short interaction between the Managing Director and Operations 
Director. The conversation highlights the revelation that they had a (potentially) redundant 
view of the importance of their products. 
Managing Director: “I am depressed, we are being stuffed by our customers; we are locked into 
the risk of the customer.” 
Operations Director: “We give value, create value for others, why? We take a worthless product 
and create value in the process, for little reward.” 
Excerpt 3 
The two Directors were beginning to recognise their changing situation, and in the 
process, challenge their assumption about the importance of their products to their future 
success. They were beginning to open up and let go of the assumption that ‘Scotch whisky is 
king’. They had not fully realised the emergence of processes in their environment, the 
consequences of the emerging processes and the implications they had for their business. 
Such insights about their fluxing and flowing context acted as the second order temporary 
breakdown where they realised the significance and limitations of their current practices 
(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Argyris & Schön, 1978). This breakdown signaled ‘limits’ to 
the current knowledge and understanding of their business reality within the management 
team. They realised that their guiding assumptions and understanding of the wider industry 
dynamics were deeply flawed and misaligned with their reality.  
The second order temporary breakdown triggered a wider discussion amongst the 
management team. They began to ‘relevate’ (Paton, et al., 2014) their experiences to develop 
a new understanding of their existing context. 
Quality Manager: “Could there be an Asda Global Inc. who is able to utilise database 
marketing? They would use technology to create value and not to reduce costs.” 
Operations Director: “We have the wrong mind-set (i.e. production orientation).” 
Marketing Director: “If we were the distributor we would know the size of your shoes, the 
colour of your socks, when and where you bought them.” 
Managing Director: “How do we react to the situation? How do we become proactive?”  
Operations Director: “We need to go straight to consumers.” 
Quality Manager: “If we were going to be a provider, who would be our potential partners?”  
Managing Director: “I am hearing new ideas. We have opened up to a business we think we 
know about, now we are thinking about it differently.” 
Excerpt 4 
The conversation reveals the emergence of new possibilities and understanding of the 
unfolding competitive and supply chain dynamics. The participants realised that the role of 
technology along with the technological affordances, has fundamentally challenged their 
understanding of their business context. Technologies like the electronic point of sale 
16 
 
(EPOS), customer relationship management (CRM) systems and real-time logistics, had the 
capability to create new means of ‘organising’ that would fundamentally alter the firm’s 
future. The management team became aware of the significance of information technology 
and realised that, as a business, they had no visibility or access to the data generated by their 
customer EPOS, CRM and logistics systems. Additionally, they also realised that technology 
was creating a barrier between them and their consumers. Failure to act could limit their 
understanding of consumer buying behaviour in the future. This realisation that insights into 
consumer behaviour was fast emerging as the basis of market power led the firm to explore 
and identify a new ‘logic’ for future organising. 
Human Resource Director: “The big issue for us is our role in the future – integration or stand 
alone?” 
Managing Director: “We have been manoeuvred by our customers. There are no two customers alike. 
It is difficult to predict their demands.” 
Quality Manager: “Distributor power is disturbing for us. The exercise has crystalised that access to 
the market is critical.” 
Operations Director: “One issue has come into focus. Flexibility is in question. It uses up more of the 
plant. Certain areas have pressures.” 
Managing Director: “We have discovered pressure on our customer orientation. More business 
reduces flexibility” 
Operations Director: “More customers, more problems. More customers, less flexibility. Our business 
idea is not ideal” 
Marketing Director: “Our business is out of balance. We are corrupted by the changing circumstances 
of our customers”.  
Group Business Development Manager: “How do we improve customer service?” 
Excerpt 5 
 
Excerpt 5, suggests that the management team was struggling to articulate elements of their 
new understanding and its subsequent implications for organising. It became evident to them 
that they were detached and distant from consumers and their buying patterns. Technological 
advancements were undermining their business model and handing power to distributors (if 
nothing else changed). The emerging situation presented the firm’s operations with a 
trilemma: Organising for products, organising for customers or organising for flexibility in 
production? The management team had yet to recognise this trilemma and its consequences 
for operations and strategy prior to the scenario workshops. This recognition triggered the 
following conversation: 
Marketing Director: “I have always held the view that whisky is the scarcity. Whisky is king.” 
Operations Director: “Yet, existing plants are running at 50% capacity!” 
Managing Director: “How do we surround the customer?” 
Operations Director: “What do we do best? Technology changes the game.” 
Quality Manager: “Power is with the producers, but power is bigger through distribution. Power 
defines the rules of the game.” 
Operations Director: “Technology cannot give power to consumers. They are mass market; 
therefore, they have no power.”  
Marketing Director: “Who owns the consumer?” 




The above conversation highlights the rigid assumptions held within the management 
team regarding the importance of Scotch whisky for the firm’s (historical and future) success. 
Yet, the team realised that this ‘whisky’ centric assumption was flawed and that a new 
organising logic was required to secure the firm’s future competitive advantage. Technology 
enabled processes were altering the competitive landscape of the whisky industry. Competing 
within this new landscape would require the firm to harness the potential of information 
technology and integrate IT capabilities with current operations. This ‘information’ centric 
model could serve as the basis of future organising. 
5. ANALYSIS  
In this section, we further probe the links between scenarios and the organisational 
learning process. For this, we present both the ‘actions’ and the ‘reflections’ of the 
management team during the longitudinal scenarios planning workshops (Bootz, 2010). The 
excerpts presented in the Findings section are now analysed in conjunction with empirical 
evidence from the scenario planning process to further illustrate the ‘unlearning’ process that 
occurred during the scenarios workshops. In the sections that follow, we present the four 
stages of this ‘unlearning’ process. 
5.1 Challenge to managerial assumptions 
The management team had deeply held assumptions about their business and what 
made it successful. They believed that ‘whisky is king’ and that the ‘Precious Scotch’ was the 
scarcity in the market-place. This assumption was also widely held in the industry. By 
holding ‘Precious Scotch’ as the dominant management paradigm, the team believed that 
they would be able to control demand for their whisky products and thus ensure production 
control (and consequently efficiencies in distilling, blending and bottling). Doing so would 
create market power and lead to profits. Investing a share of the profits into branding, they 
believed, would help them protect and retain their market power. The causal representation of 
the ‘Precious Scotch’ paradigm is summarised in Figure 4.  
<INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
Figure 4 reveals two positive feedback loops interacting with each other to create a 
virtuous cycle for the organisation. However, while developing the scenarios the management 
team realised that their wider environment was changing. Key customers, e.g. large hotel 
chains, supermarkets were investing in electronic point of sales (EPOS) technology to help 
them develop relationships with the end user (e.g. consumers). EPOS systems provided the 
large hotel chains and supermarkets with profiles of and insights into consumer spending 
practices and product preferences. This knowledge particularly helped the supermarkets 
utilise the data from their EPOS system to develop customer relationship management 
systems (CRM) to target consumers with ‘special offers’ e.g. discount vouchers to be offset 
against future purchases of preferred products or vouchers to be used to ‘push’ products that 
the supermarkets would use to attract consumers. 
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In addition to investing in EPOS and CRM systems the supermarkets were also 
investing in logistics and distribution systems to help them manage and control incoming 
orders and replenish their shops and stores in the most efficient manner possible. Initially the 
supermarkets were predominately interested in ensuring adequate stocks of whisky products 
to fulfil consumer demand. The unintended consequence of investing in EPOS and CRM 
systems was their ability to control whisky production by consolidating knowledge of 
consumer buying preferences. Such information helped them to reduce their buying costs. 
Such investment started as a necessity but turned into a competitive advantage. Over time the 
supermarkets would utilise their technology to exert power over all aspects of supply chain 
management. These investments were leading to a situation that would move market power 
from the ‘Precious Scotch’ paradigm to the supermarkets and their technological systems. 
The causal representation of this emerging logic is summarised in Figure 5.  
<INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
5.2 Rigidities of imagination 
Figure 5, reveals a third positive feedback loop. This loop represents the supermarket 
investment in technology that enabled a shift in market power towards them. This resulted in 
a vicious cycle that undermined the ‘Precious Scotch’ paradigm. Ironically, the supermarket 
approach also reduced the efficacy of investing in branding by the whisky producers. In the 
producer paradigm (Figure 1) the key lever to enhancing market power was investing in 
branding. Supermarket product targeting made this lever less effective.  
Excerpt 2 highlights the emerging foresights for the management team.  They were 
able to make connections between previously unconnected events (Figure 5). This led them to 
realise that the emerging technological capability of the supermarkets was eroding their 
market power, and undermining their ‘Precious Scotch’ paradigm. The management team 
realised that investment in EPOS and CRM systems by supermarkets enabled them to 
develop insights into consumer preferences. These insights allowed the supermarkets to 
promote product targeting to the end consumer. For example, the supermarkets could use 
their loyalty cards to target or not ‘promote’ brands, equally limit or withhold shelf space for 
whisky products. These practices began to erode the power of the whisky producers. Further, 
product targeting by supermarkets also forced the whisky producer to increase their 
investment in branding with the false hope of restoring market power. The increased 
investment in branding did not increase profits and this further eroded their market power. 
This resulted in supermarkets controlling demand for whisky which in turn influenced 
production control. The management trilemma highlighted earlier resulted from this 
emerging and developing dynamic. However, the management team were yet to comprehend 
the significance of these emerging dynamics for their business. 
Excerpt 2 also illustrates how 'unlearning' occurred when the management team were 
able to draw on their historical actions and reflect on these actions in light of the emerging 
situation. For example, historically, when the firm over produced whisky, they sold off their 
'Precious Scotch' to supermarkets who would then create ‘buyers-own-brands’ for the 
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shoppers / consumers. The firm believed that the selloff would help them drain their ‘whisky 
loch’, generate cash and increase the future scarcity of their 'Precious Scotch'. However, the 
creation of ‘buyers-own-brands’ triggered both a price war and a fight for supermarket shelf 
space. The unintended consequence of these actions was increased price competition for 
whisky brands. The disappointment from this oversight which can be attributed to the rigidity 
of the management team’s assumptions is well expressed in Excerpt 3. It is the recognition of 
this oversight that triggers ‘unlearning’.  
5.3 Unlearning 
Awareness of their oversight acted as a jolt for the management team. Excerpts 3 and 
4 demonstrate how the management team were ‘struck’ by this revelation. Excerpts 4, 5 and 6 
show them questioning the logic of their current approach to business. Faced with this 
revelation the management team had choices, they could either be anxious and defensive 
about business-as-usual or they could grapple with the implication of this revelation and its 
implications for their business going forward. Excerpt 4 illustrates how the management team 
began questioning their assumptions and exploring how they might react to their new 
insights. They speculate about possibilities and tentatively probe their future. The 
management team's reaction support 'unlearning' when they acknowledge that the approach 
that has served them well in the past would no longer be relevant in the future. The Managing 
Director’s eagerness for 'new ideas' to open up the business is a consequence of the 
unlearning that has taken place. However, it is important to recognise that unlearning does 
not directly lead to 'solutions'. As Excerpts 4 and 5 demonstrate, unlearning caused the 
management team to open up to new thoughts and an idea not previously considered: the role 
of information and technology as the basis of gaining market power.   
Unlearning, therefore, as Excerpt 6 suggests, highlighted contradictions between the 
management team's long-held belief about ‘Precious Scotch’ and the operational reality that 
despite being 'precious' their plants were only running at "50% capacity". Unlearning also 
helped the managers to revise their 'problem definition' about production control. They 
realised that further investment into branding to maintain the 'scarcity' of whisky is futile and 
will not allow them to protect their market power. Their rigid assumptions had caused them 
to misunderstand their past actions which actually compounded their current problems by 
triggering a 'price war' that made Scotch less 'precious' in the eyes of the consumer. By 
letting-go of their previously held assumptions, unlearning opened them up to the possibility 
of strategic foresight. Unlearning allowed the management team to realise that whisky was no 
longer king and their inability to capture and utilise sales information was limiting the 
efficiency of their operations. Letting-go of the ‘whisky is king’ assumption allowed them to 
see their production issues in a new light. 
5.4 Inquiry and (Re)learning 
Having realised that “Information is the new king”, the management team began to 
explore for a new basis of success. The supermarket investment in technology was resulting 
in new capabilities that allowed them to dictate the demand and price to whisky producers. 
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The market power was gradually shifting from the producers of ‘Scotch Whisky’ to the 
retailers of ‘Scotch Whisky’. This unlearning had triggered a second-order temporary 
breakdown (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Argyris & Schön, 1978) where previously held 
views could not be reconciled with new insights about their unfolding situation. The 
management team began to use the scenarios approach to create the space for self-
distanciation (Tsoukas, 2009) to reflect on and re-interpret the consequences of the 
‘information is the new king’ paradigm for their business. The strategic foresight that 
emerged is summarised in Figure 6 below. 
<INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
Self-distanciation facilitated novelty and new thinking where management 
“judgement arises from the self-conscious use of the prefix re: the desire to re-order, to re-
arrange, to re-design what one knows and thus create new angles of vision or new knowledge 
for scientific or aesthetic purposes” (Bell, 1999, p. xiv). By harnessing their insights about 
technological change the management team identified the crucial role of information 
technology and customer data for future success. The management team harnessed these 
scenario insights to innovate and create the ‘Customer Service Centre’ that would capture 
supermarket demand information flows, and aggregate them to aid production control, thus 
creating a new positive feedback loop for the firm. The ‘information is the new king’ 
paradigm also threw new light onto the trilemma facing their operations. The management 
team now realised that any potential solution that they might have considered previously 
would have compounded the situation. By capturing and consolidating customer orders in a 
timely manner through the ‘Customer Service Centre’, they would be able to develop demand 
intelligence that would help them plan and manage their operations to achieve economies of 
scale in production.  
The resulting foresight led them to identify that they would need to create a 
‘Customer Service Centre’ (Company Annual Accounts) to harness technological innovation 
and help them understand and manage future customer re-ordering processes. Previously 
customer re-ordering was sporadic and resulted in either short-run changes to production or 
longer-run production for stock. Both approaches were impacting negatively on the 
profitability of the business. In Excerpt 6 the Operations Director noted that ‘information is 
the new king’ and it is argued here that such a transformation in understanding exemplifies 
strategic foresight through unlearning. The original and revised theoretical links between 
scenario planning, strategic foresight and organizational learning are summarised in Figure 7 
below. 
<INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE> 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
So how does strategic foresight emerge from scenarios? The evidence from our 
longitudinal field study reveal, perhaps counterintuitively, how unlearning rather than 
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learning helped generate the strategic foresight. By examining the actual temporal sequence 
of events within the foresight generation process, our findings and analysis demonstrate how 
the unlearning process (Figure 7) played a key role in helping the whisky producer overcome 
the rigidities of their imagination. Without unlearning, the whiskey producer was locked into 
single loop learning where the ‘learning traps’ prevented the generation of strategic foresight. 
Strategic foresight only emerged when the beliefs of the management team were transformed 
by the challenge to their managerial assumptions, recognition of rigidities in their 
imagination, unlearning followed by inquiry and (re)learning. Thus, unlearning serves as a 
mechanism that allows organizations to switch from single to double loop learning. Yet, 
crucially double loop learning generated strategic foresight, not by offering insights gained 
from anticipations of the future (Tapinos & Pyper, 2018; Ringland, 2010; 1998), but rather by 
allowing the whisky producer to obtain a better understanding of the 'present' in the here and 
now. 
Our study also highlights the limitations of learning from organizational experience. 
We notice in Excerpt 1 that the firm was initially caught in a ‘competency’ trap (Levitt & 
March, 1988, p. 322). They believed that their operational experience with production, 
distilling, blending and bottling will allow them to make efficiency gains and increase their 
competitive advantage. When viewed through the current organizational learning lens used 
by scenario theorists, the scenario in Figure 4, would trigger single loop learning (Bootz, et 
al., 2019; Argyris & Schön, 1978), where the management team can act to rectify mistakes, 
but without fundamentally changing their representations. The competency trap is therefore 
reinforced leading to strategic oversight rather than foresight. 
Similarly, Excerpts 2, 3 and 6 illustrate the superstitious learning trap (Levitt & 
March, 1988, p. 325) where learning reinforced the ‘Precious Scotch’ paradigm and the 
‘whisky is king’ logic within the management team. While scenario theorists have suggested 
the need for ‘double loop learning’ that helps organizations shift their “system of norms, 
beliefs and organizational rules” (Bootz, et al., 2019, p. 93; Argyris & Schön, 1978), the 
scenarios literature is silent on how this can be brought about. We suggest that the 
‘unlearning’ mechanism that we have proposed can act as a natural bridge to help 
organizations switch from single to double loop learning. 
Finally, Excerpt 4, and Figure 6 offer evidence for how the whisky producer 
overcame the myopia trap (Levinthal & March, 1993). By recognising their flawed ‘mind-set’ 
(Operations Director) and encouraging ‘new ideas’ (Managing Director), the team were able 
to effect the shift from operational efficiency to ‘information is the new king’ paradigm as the 
basis of success. They also realised the myopia of investing in branding and recognized the 
importance of investing in a Customer Service Centre for business effectiveness. These shifts 
are summarised in Table 1 below.  
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
These findings enable us to reassess the current debate amongst scenario theorists on 
the role played by organizational learning in the generation of strategic foresight (Bootz, et 
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al., 2019; Bootz, 2010; Haeffner, et al., 2012; Derbyshire & Wright, 2014; Wright, et al., 
2013; Wright & Goodwin, 2009). Our findings suggest that ‘learning traps’ play a crucial role 
in determining whether organizational learning from scenarios generates strategic foresight or 
strategic oversight (Chermack, et al., 2015). If learning traps are present, then scenario 
planning is likely to inhibit learning by distorting perceptions of environmental uncertainty 
by using simplistic assumptions that narrow mental models and limit the range of possible 
outcomes (Derbyshire & Wright, 2014; Wright, et al., 2013; Wright & Goodwin, 2009). 
However, if the learning traps are identified and overcome, as it was in our field study, then 
scenario planning is likely to foster strategic foresight because learning allows the 
organization to re-perceive its environment (Wack, 1985a; 1985b) which in turn leads to 
strategic foresight (Chermack, 2005). In other words, contrary to prior claims, the 
relationship between scenario planning, organizational learning and strategic foresight is 
rarely straight forward (refer original theoretical model Figure 7) and is influenced by the 
presence or absence of the competency, superstitious learning and myopia ‘learning traps’.  
The empirical evidence from our study on ‘unlearning’ also allows us to weigh into 
the current theoretical debate regarding the concept (Howells & Scholderer, 2016; Tsang, 
2017a; 2017b; Klein, 1989). We define unlearning as a process of recognising, 
acknowledging and letting go of prior learning (including assumptions and mental 
frameworks) in order to relevate new learning possibilities. Our definition of unlearning is 
significantly different from Hedberg’s (1981) original definition. We developed this 
definition by exploring the etymological roots of the word ‘learn’. According to The Oxford 
Dictionary of English Etymology, ‘learn’ originated from the Old High German word lernen 
whose root lois (from which lernen is derived) originally meant "furrow, track.". Hence, 
lernen originally meant "to follow or find the track" (Hoad, 2003, p. our emphasis). 
Unlearning, we argue, implies eradicating furrows and returning to the unfurrowed flux of 
organisational experience from which new possibilities are ‘relevated’ (Paton, et al., 2014). 
Unlearning requires letting go or relaxing the rigidities of previously held assumptions and 
beliefs, rather than forgetting them, as part of the general approach to creating strategic 
foresight. 
Therefore, it is incorrect to conflate unlearning with either forgetting as Howells and 
Scholderer (2016) do or discarding old experiences, as Hedberg (1981) and Nystrom and 
Starbuck (1984) have claimed. Unlearning involves recognition and acknowledgement of the 
limits of current knowledge and insights that may have outlived their utility. Further, 
unlearning need not necessarily precede learning (single loop learning for instance does not 
require unlearning), however it must precede foresight. Unlearning is therefore a necessary, 
but not a sufficient condition, for strategic foresight. Finally, we agree with Howells and 
Scholderer (2016) when they say that unlearning cannot be managed. In our study, the 
unlearning and subsequent foresight emerged inadvertently as the management team relaxed 
their rigid assumptions. The ‘reflexivity’ (Cunliffe, 2002) of the participants played a crucial 
role in the inquiry and (re)learning that succeeded unlearning. Table 2 below offers a 
comparative summary of our unlearning concept/mechanism.   
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
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Our findings bear significant insights for the strategic foresight literature. Foresight in 
our study emerged from the participants gaining insights about their changing competitive 
landscape and then using those insights to re-perceive their environment, firm and to probe 
future possibilities. Foresight, did not emerge from the development of strategic options 
(Ringland, 2010; Tapinos & Pyper, 2018) and the use of scenarios as wind-tunnels for testing 
these options (van der Heijden, 2005). Additionally, our study shows how foresight can also 
emerge from a better understanding of the 'present' in the here and now. A clearer 
understanding of the ‘present’ allows businesses to re-perceive their firm and environment 
and future actions through previously imperceptible ways. These are the reasons why such 
foresight is ‘prospective’ rather than ‘retrospective’. Unlearning is thus one of the means to 
cultivate strategic foresight. Future research can therefore identify “organising practices and 
activities” (Sarpong & Maclean, 2016, p. 2013) that facilitate unlearning.  
The study also support suggestions “that companies should invest in pedagogically 
rich scenario processes that develop the capability of managers to sense changes” (Rhisiart, et 
al., 2015, p. 124). Prior research by Schoemaker (1995) has distinguished between three 
categories of foresight relevant knowledge: 1. Things we know we know, 2. Things we know 
we do not know and 3. Things we do not know we do not know. Unlearning can be used as a 
mechanism to enable firms to transition from Category 3 to Category 2. It can also alert 
organizations to the learning traps that could plague Category 1 knowledge. Mere exploration 
using scenario planning without unlearning may not facilitate transitions between categories 
3 and 2 for a key reason why Category 3 blind spots exists and persists is because single loop 
learning and learning traps (especially the myopia trap) ensure that learning from exploring 
scenarios remains constrained. Therefore, without unlearning and double loop learning, it is 
not possible for participants to even realise ‘what’ is constraining their current ‘exploration’ 
and the means through which they can re-perceive the ‘familiar’ in ‘unfamiliar’ ways.  
Scenario theorists can also draw on our process methodology (Langley, et al., 2013; 
Langley, 1999; Van de Ven & Huber, 1990) and adapt their foresight studies to investigate 
other organizational phenomena like improved decision making (Derbyshire & Wright, 
2017), knowledge management (Bootz, et al., 2019) and dynamic capabilities (Rohrbeck, 
2012). Our approach allows theorists to capture and establish a link between a firm’s 
reflection and action (Bootz, 2010, p. 1591) thereby increasing the validity of their theoretical 
explanation. 
Finally, we concur with Rhisiart, et al (2015) when they state that “the greatest 
potential for innovation, progress and insight in strategic foresight may be found in the 
richness of contemporary debates on the organisations, strategy and social theory – and their 
epistemological and ontological foundations” (p. 127). Recent advancements within process 
research studies has proposed the need for a Becoming mode of theorising predicated on a 
process ontology (MacKay & Chia, 2013; Langley & Tsoukas, 2010; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002; 
Chia, 1999). Developing scenario planning theory from a Becoming perspective could be yet 





We began our paper by asking: How does organizational learning emanating from 
scenarios generate strategic foresight?  Whilst there is widespread acknowledgement of the 
effectiveness of scenario planning for generating strategic foresight (Spaniol & Rowland, 
2018; Wright, et al., 2015; Ramirez, et al., 2011; Varum & Melo, 2010; Cairns, et al., 2004; 
van der Heijden, et al., 2002; Duncan & Wack, 1993; Wack, 1985a; 1985b), few studies have 
examined the assumptions that lead to this assertion. Questions about how and why scenario 
planning leads to strategic foresight have received little theoretical and empirical attention 
(Bootz, et al., 2019). Addressing these questions requires us to critically examine the 
conceptual and theoretical links between scenarios, strategic foresight and organizational 
learning.  
Our study makes five specific contributions. First, our paper responds to calls for 
confronting “foresight practices with a complete and coherent theoretical framework built 
from a detailed analysis of the concept of organizational learning” (Bootz, 2010, p. 1592). 
We not only identify the imprecise use of scenarios as both mechanism and outcome as the 
source of methodological chaos (Martelli, 2001; Spaniol & Rowland, 2018) within foresight 
studies but also theorise and problematize the ‘rigid’ assumptions that link organizational 
learning with strategic foresight.  
Second, our research clarifies a crucial puzzle that has persisted within foresight 
studies on whether scenario planning fosters (Wack, 1985a; 1985b; de Geus, 1998; 
Chermack, et al., 2015) or inhibits (Derbyshire & Wright, 2014; Wright, et al., 2013; Wright 
& Goodwin, 2009) organizational learning that generates strategic foresight? Our analysis has 
demonstrated how organizational learning yields strategic foresight if and only if scenarios 
lead to detection and correction of errors. We have also unearthed the previously overlooked 
possibilities of ‘learning traps’ that inhibits organizational learning. The presence or absence 
of learning traps therefore determine whether scenario planning aids or hinders organizational 
learning that generates strategic foresight. 
Third, by theorising and developing a process research methodology (Van de Ven & 
Huber, 1990; Van de Ven, 1992; Langley, et al., 2013) within scenarios, we introduce a novel 
approach that allows scenario theorists to pry open, explore and explain various kinds of 
‘black-boxes’ that link scenarios with their stated organizational outcomes. The approach 
allows us to capture both actions and reflections of the participants as they take part in the 
scenario exercises. The methodology also offers theorists the opportunity to create the know-
how knowledge valued by practitioners (Langley, et al., 2013). 
Fourth, rather than assuming that scenario planning triggers organizational learning 
that yields strategic foresight, our longitudinal study helps unpack the complexities inherent 
within organizational learning and demonstrates how strategic foresight emerged from 
‘unlearning’. Therefore, by uncovering and specifying the ‘unlearning’ mechanism our study 
reveals how scenarios generate strategic foresight.   
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Finally, our research also weighs in on the current theoretical debate on ‘unlearning’ 
(Howells & Scholderer, 2016; Tsang, 2017a; 2017b). Our analysis suggests that while the 
critics of ‘unlearning’ (Howells & Scholderer, 2016; Klein, 1989) are right to point to the 
imprecisions within the original conceptualization of the concept, their critique of 
"unlearning" is neither unambiguous nor are their arguments supporting the empirical 
unwarrantedness of “unlearning” logically tenable (Tsang, 2017a; 2017b). Therefore, by re-
exploring the etymological roots of ‘learn’ from which ‘unlearning’ is derived, we offer and 
discuss a more precise conceptualization of ‘unlearning’. We argue that unlearning, in 
practice, requires letting go or relaxing the rigidly held assumptions as part of a general 
approach to creating strategic foresight. Thus, we offer a more precise theoretical model 
(Figure 7) that summarizes the links between scenario planning, organizational learning and 
strategic foresight. 
To conclude, we have exposed some of the theoretical orthodoxy within the scenario 
literature, particularly, with regards to the links between organizational learning and strategic 
foresight. The unlearning mechanism that we have unearthed and developed in this paper 
offers a novel explanation for how strategic foresight actually emerges from scenarios. We 
hope that our theoretical and methodological contributions will stimulate new practitioner 
foresights and scholarly debates, thereby moving knowledge forward. 
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Figure 7: Theoretical Model for Strategic Foresight through 'Unlearning' 
